Believable Victims: Asylum Credibility and the Struggle for Objectivity by Kagan, Michael
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2015
Believable Victims: Asylum Credibility and the
Struggle for Objectivity
Michael Kagan
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Judges
Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at
the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation




Asylum Credibiliy and the Struggle for Objectivity
Michael Kagan
In April 2oo2, the United Kingdom government issued a
report about human rights violations in Sudan. It contained
exactly three sentences about problems in Darfur, referenc-
ing vague "claims" of "inter-ethnic" fighting. It concluded
that "there is no evidence" of systematic persecution in Dar-
fur.' A year later, Darfur would become one of the world's
most well known cases of systematic persecution, to the
extent that many considered it genocide. While the situation
in Darfur certainly worsened from 2002 to 2003, the more
dramatic change may have been the way in which the world
suddenly became aware of a long-brewing crisis.
Asylum adjudication is often the invisible frontline in the
struggle by oppressed groups to gain recognition for their
plights. Through this process, individual people must tell
their stories and try to show that they are genuine victims of
persecution rather than simply illegal immigrants attempting
to slip through the system. In 2002, because the world had
not yet acknowledged the nature of the calamity from which
they were escaping, many Darfurian asylum cases would
have relied on the ability of each individual to convince
government offices to believe their stories. They would have
had to be deemed "credible," or they would be in danger
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of being sent home. Today, a similar
process is playing out for youths fleeing
gang violence in Central America. The
204 State Department Human Rights
Report on Guatemala, for instance,
includes three sentences about gangs
recruiting "street children."' But recent
arrivals pleading to stay in the U.S. have
described a far direr situation.3
Credibility is not an explicit legal
requirement for being recognized as a
refugee, or for winning asylum. The
legal criteria derive from the United
Nations' 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, which requires an
asylum-seeker to show a "well-founded
fear of being persecuted" for reason of
race, religion, nationality, membership
in a political social group, or politi-
cal opinion. In theory, if independent
evidence showed that a person was in
clear danger of persecution, it might
not be necessary for the asylum-seeker
to even testify. Imagine, for instance,
if a three-year-old Jewish child arrived
from Germany in 1941, and either gave
completely arbitrary information or
none at all. It would clearly violate the
Refugee Convention to refuse her asy-
lum simply because her testimony was
not credible in a strict sense. But such
scenarios are extraordinarily rare.
Asylum-seekers typically arrive with
no independent evidence that they
really face such a danger. As a result, it
is a practical necessity for asylum-seek-
ers to be believed, as they usually cannot
prove their cases except through their
own testimony. For the current cases of
Central American youths, even if the
government were to accept that gang
violence in general might be grounds
for asylum, it would be left to indi-
vidual applicants to explain how such
violence places them in personal and
immediate danger. Previous research
has shown that individual credibility
assessment determines the fates of more
asylum applications than do the techni-
cal legal criteria." Yet this is a fraught
process. The fact that genuine refugees
cannot conclusively prove their perse-
cution has led the United Nations to
call for asylum-seekers to be granted
the "benefit of the doubt."5
However, this very same reality has led
to doubts about asylum-seekers' verac-
ity. William Hague, the British For-
eign Secretary until 204, once made a
major political speech complaining that
"bogus claimants" were flooding the
United Kingdom.6 In 2014, Ameri-
can law enforcement arrested around
thirty individuals for running an asy-
lum fraud ring, which the New York Times
dubbed "an industry of lies."' In 2014,
one can see doubts about the veracity of
asylum-seekers as mapped onto politi-
cal reactions to the influx of Central
American youth. New Mexico Con-
gressman Steve Pearce, who made a
brief visit to Guatemala and Honduras,
publicly disputed whether the children
are really fleeing from violence.' Inves-
tor's Business Daily claimed that the chil-
dren prey on American "gullibility."9
One by one and case by case, asy-
lum-seekers must navigate the ten-
sion between refugee protection and
migration control as they struggle to
be deemed "credible." In this process,
asylum-seekers face a paradox created
by our modern media environment.
Today, there is more information
readily available about other countries
than ever before. Reports that were
once published annually and available
only in a government library are now
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a click away and updated throughout
the year. But this does not mean that
every human rights abuse is immedi-
ately reported, even if we have created
the impression of a culture of access
to complete information. And just as
more information is available more
quickly, public opinion can also be
aroused quickly, creating the potential
for political pressure on an asylum
system before there has been sufficient
time to consider each claim carefully.
Images of Genuine Victims.
Asylum is hardly the only field in which
an adjudicator must decide whether a
particular witness should be believed.
But it is unique in that the stakes
are unusually high, and there is typi-
cally little or no independent evidence
to corroborate an applicant's account.
Asylum adjudication is also an intense-
ly personal process, involving lengthy
interviews about painful subjects, often
in private rooms where the adjudicator
and the applicant are the only people
present. Subjectivity and inconsistency
remain inherent in asylum adjudica-
genuine victim is likely to look and talk
can be unusually important. Consider,
as an example, the potential role that
gender might play in this process. In
other legal contexts, social scientists
have detected a tendency for adjudica-
tors in particular to be especially pro-
tective of female victims and especially
punitive both toward men who abuse
women and toward women who do not
adhere to conventional images of femi-
ninity. Professor Jacqueline Bhabha
has warned that asylum cases often turn
on "simplistic, even derogatory, char-
acterizations of asylum seekers' coun-
tries of origin as areas of barbarism or
which lack civility." Post-9/II studies
have shown a tendency for Western pol-
iticians and media to portray Muslim
men as dangerous, while Muslim wom-
en are seen as victims.' Such images of
victims and perpetrators can help or
hinder an asylum-seeker's quest to be
believed, especially given court culture.
Immigration judges work in a setting in
which implicit bias is especially likely to
influence decision making because they
are systemically overworked and have
Not every human rights abuse is immediately
reported, even if we have created the impression of a
culture of access to complete information.
tions."o More specifically, governments
and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remain
divided on whether it is appropriate for
adjudicators to consider an applicant's
demeanor in determining credibility."
In a context where unstructured sub-
jectivity can play such a pivotal role,
unarticulated assumptions about how a
little time for deliberate decision mak-
ing or analysis.' 5
The tendency for adjudicators to
import preconceptions into asylum cas-
es can often be vividly seen with asylum
claims based on religion. When asylum-
seekers flee persecution in countries
like Iran or Eritrea because they con-
verted from one religion or another,
Winter/Spring 2015 [1251
BELIEVABLE VICTIMS
their cases often turn on whether they
are seen as genuine in their faith. This
can lead government officials to harshly
interrogate asylum-seekers on matters
of religion. This has led to many a
contentious situation. In one notable
case, an American appeals court com-
plained that an immigration judge had
administered "a mini-catechism."1 6 In
an Australian case, a judge suggested
that it is a contradiction to claim to be
both gay and Catholic. 7 An American
court once doubted whether an Iranian
had actually converted from Islam to
Christianity because he continued to
eat pork-free meals in prison.a Taking
even another step further, in Europe,
some governments have been accused
of trying to test the truthfulness of gay
asylum-seekers by measuring their sex-
ual arousal while forcing them to watch
pornography. 9
Studies have found that asylum adju-
dicators also make assumptions about
how a person fleeing persecution
and persecutory governments should
behave. Adjudicators base decisions on
assumptions about how people would
behave in the face of persecution, as
well as about how persecutory govern-
ments would act. A study in Britain
found that asylum adjudicators disbe-
lieved applicants' accounts of perse-
cution because, among other things,
they assumed a foreign government
would "make discrete inquiries" rather
than arrest a dissident. In another case,
adjudicators doubted that a government
prosecutor in another country might
swear or use ethnic slurs."o Moreover,
a Canadian study found that asylum
adjudicators made assumptions about
how people would behave in the face
of danger, with the assumptions often
contradicting social science literature
about how people actually behave in
such circumstances."
Accepting a Level of Doubt. One
of the challenges facing asylum adjudi-
cators is that it is rare to ever learn
with certainty whether an individual is
actually telling the truth, much less how
high the risk of persecution really is. In
some cases, this only becomes clear in
retrospect. For example, we now know
the scale of government-sponsored
ethnic violence in Darfur, and that an
asylum-seeker who reported escalating
attacks in late 2002 would have been
telling the truth. An asylum adjudica-
tor, though, would not have been able
to see this so clearly based on the infor-
mation that was available at the time.
In common law legal traditions, dif-
ferent types of cases call for differ-
ent levels of proof. Convictions in a
criminal trial require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, while civil cases
typically require a mere probability or
preponderance of the evidence. These
differences approximate the differ-
ent stakes in different cases, and may
be best understood by the legal sys-
tem's willingness to accept occasional
errors. In criminal cases, the danger
of convicting an innocent person of a
serious crime calls for the most strin-
gent burden of proof possible so as to
make errors as rare as possible. In civil
cases, the system is willing to accept a
higher degree of error, and thus sets
a lower standard of proof. In all areas
of law, adjudicators must constantly
adjust their willingness to accept doubt,
balancing against the harms that would
result from an incorrect decision.
The balance in refugee cases is
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unique, and calls for a particularly
low standard of proof. If a genuine
refugee is errantly rejected, the harm is
immediate and severe. A person will be
deported to a place where he or she is
in danger of persecution. But the harm
from a fraudulent applicant slipping
through the system is more diffuse.
While a single high profile case may
create a strong public impression about
the whole system, the vast majority of
asylum claims remain anonymous and
confidential. The true danger of false
claims slipping through is that, cumu-
latively, they may produce a public sense
that the asylum system lacks integrity.
This, in turn, would then fuel more
draconian measures against all asylum
claims. In theory, fraudulent asylum
claims might be analogous to counter-
feit money. A single fake bill does not
have any significant macroeconomic
impact, but if too many enter circula-
tion, the results could be disastrous.
Asylum law has tried to accommodate
this delicate balance by establishing a
fairly low, yet certainly more nuanced,
argues that an asylum-seeker should
be considered credible if his or her
account is "capable of being believed.""
This does not require that an adjudi-
cator be entirely free of doubt. It also
does not require the level of certainty
that might be demanded in a crimi-
nal case. It is not, however, such a low
standard that even a story no reasonable
person could believe would be accept-
ed. Instead, it creates a middle ground
protecting the lives of those who, if not
for the lower threshold, might be sent
back to a country where they could face
certain persecution and perhaps even
death.
Moving Toward Objectivity. In
1989, UNHCR advised that refugee
credibility assessment "be a matter of
personal judgment."" This was typi-
cal of early approaches to credibility
assessment. This subjective approach
is closely tied to two related ideas that
have long legal roots, but may empiri-
cally be quite questionable. The first
idea is that directly observing the way
If a genuine refugee is errantly rejected, the harm
is immediate and severe.. .but the harm of a
fraudulent applicant slipping through the system is
more diffuse.
threshold of proof in asylum cases. An
asylum claim may be based solely on the
applicant's own testimony if no other
evidence is reasonably available. More
to the point, UNHCR has tried to
steer credibility assessment away from
a search for truth, given that doubts
nearly always remain. Instead, UNHCR
a person talks will reveal their level of
honesty, as lying will be indicated by the
way they talk or by their demeanor. Yet,
social scientists have not found much
evidence that demeanor actually assists
much in detecting falsehood." The sec-
ond idea that supports the subjective
approach is the rule in many legal sys-
Winter/Spring 2015 [1271
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tems that appellate courts should defer
to first instance adjudicators on cred-
ibility precisely because they listened to
and watched the testimony directly. The
result of such rules is that high courts
are often reluctant to step in to offer
clear guidance on credibility questions
the way they might on questions of law.
In addition to the limited usefulness
of demeanor, a significant difficulty
with asylum credibility is that adju-
dicators may not learn to be better at
interpreting it through experience. The
reason for this is that we rarely find out
whether an asylum decision was right
or wrong. As a result, an adjudicator
cannot learn easily from experience.
This problem is compounded when the
adjudicators are not fully independent,
as is often the case in administrative
immigration procedures.' 5 In a highly
politicized environment, where adjudi-
cators are under pressure to decide asy-
lum cases in a particular way, there is a
danger that adjudicators will be implic-
itly rewarded for confirming precon-
ceptions about asylum claims rather
than for objective analysis.
Because of these concerns, the state
of the art in credibility assessment is
to move toward a more objective ana-
lytical approach. In a comprehensive
2013 report on credibility assessment
in Europe, UNHCR advocated a struc-
tured analysis in which adjudicators
should specifically note positive and
negative factors, isolate areas of testi-
mony where credibility problems appear
to exist, and clearly articulate their rea-
soning. 6 This newer approach has been
captured in a training manual financed
by the European Commission, and is
promoted by a new UNHCR/Euro-
pean Commission project known as the
CREDO Initiative.2 7
Regrettably for asylum-seekers in the
United States, American asylum law
is in danger of being left behind by
these developments. In 2005, Con-
gress enacted the REAL ID Act, which
states that immigration judges may base
credibility assessments on, among oth-
er things, "the demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness of the applicant or wit-
ness, the inherent plausibility of the
applicant's or witness's account," and
may reject a claim in its entirety because
of any apparent inconsistency or minor
inaccuracy "without regard to whether
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or false-
hood goes to the heart of the applicant's
claim."" This law effectively enshrines
an unstructured approach to credibil-
ity that invites judges to rely on meth-
ods that have largely been rejected by
empirical science. Its biggest impact may
be to further limit the role of appellate
courts in refining the standards that
should be used to assess credibility. As
a result, as Central American children
begin to make asylum claims based on
fear of gang violence, their fates depend
largely on the approach taken by indi-
vidual judges. Somehow, even though
we live in an age of information, credi-
bility assessment still seems to be rooted
in an older era based on instinct and
unarticulated assumptions.
A careful, structured analysis of asy-
lum claims requires training, time, and
resources. Deciding refugee credibil-
ity subjectively is much faster, even if
it is less likely to be reliable. Time is
regrettably something that many asylum
systems simply do not have. Analysis of
data published by UNHCR indicates
that in 2013, at least 902,756 people
submitted individual refugee claims
[i2 8 1 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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around the world, but only 555,827
of them had their cases decided. 9 This
imbalance creates the significant danger
that adjudicators in many systems will
face pressure to simply decide cases as
fast as possible, rather than to analyze
each application carefully and articulate
their reasoning in writing. To safe-
guard against this tendency, appellate
courts need to vigilantly scrutinize asy-
lum adjudication for procedural short
cuts that impair applicants' opportuni-
ties to a full airing of their cases.
Conclusion. Human rights problems
are often sources of public controversy
because it is often debatable-at least
at first-whether claims of persecution
are real or if they are exaggerated to
serve a particular agenda. But while
these debates play out in the media and
in official statements, they also play
out with individual lives on the line.
Implicit assumptions about how foreign
countries work and, most importantly,
how a genuine victim would act or talk
can lead to inconsistent, unreliable
decisions with grave consequences for
people in danger.
The experience of the UNHCR in
deciding refugee cases in the Mid-
dle East, Africa, and Asia offers an
encouraging example of the potential
to improve the system by establishing
a more structured approach to refu-
gee status determination. In 2003,
UNHCR published for the first time
a comprehensive set of standard for its
offices in these cases, in addition to new
training programs. The new standards
were aimed at all aspects of the process,
but their general goal was to force adju-
dicators to articulate a clear logical base
for each step of their decision making.
In the context of credibility assess-
ment-which previously had accounted
for the majority of UNHCR rejec-
tions-this forces adjudicators toward
a more objective approach. Afterward,
UNHCR's recognition rate climbed
from below fifty percent to above eighty
percent.3 0 The UNHCR standards are
not meant to be applied to governments
and need not be replicated precisely,
but they illustrate the impact of moving
toward a more structured approach.
The difficulty with reality is that
the information culture in which we
live does not accept doubt easily. Our
growing access to information creates
an impression that all claims should
be immediately verifiable, and it cre-
ates an outlet by which strong opinions
may be expressed far more quickly than
ever before. Asylum cases are defined
by uncertainty, and to be decided effec-
tively they need to be analyzed methodi-
cally and slowly. This is a challenge
when systemic pressures push adjudi-
cators to make decisions quickly, and
public opinion expects certainty where
none can be had. The battle to preserve
asylum requires protecting a system
that is rigorous and objective, but in
which we must grow comfortable know-
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